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BANKRUPTCY - CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION -
DETERMINING THE STARTING DATE OF ADEQUATE
PROTECTION PAYMENTS FOR OPPORTUNITY COST
AND EXPANDING THE CONTRIBUTION EXCEPTION
TO THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE
The United States Supreme Court has granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari in A lhers v. Norwest Bank (In re A hlers), 794 F. 2d 388 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S. L. W. 3852 (U.S. June 23, 1987) (No. 86-
958). The Court has indicated that it will review the absolute priority issue,
which is discussed at length in this Comment.
On November 16, 1984, Norwest Bank of Worthington
(Norwest) initiated a replevin action against James and Mary
Ahlers in a Minnesota state court.' The Ahlers had entered into
several financing agreements with Norwest and, in return, had
given Norwest a first mortgage on their farm machinery and
equipment as collateral. 2 When the Ahlers were unable to make
payments on the loans, Norwest initiated the replevin action to
recover possession of the Ahlers' farm machinery and equipment.
3
1. Ahlers v. Norwest Bank (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388, 392 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55
U.S.L.W. 3852 (U.S.June 23, 1987) (No. 86-958).
2. Id. James and Mary Ahlers managed a grain and livestock operation on approximately 840
acres of farmland in Nobles County, Minnesota. Id. They owned 560 acres of land and rented 280
a, s. Id. The Ahlers financed the operation through four financing agreements with Federal Land
bank, which were executed between December 1965 and January 1982. Id. They gave a first
mortgage on the 560 acres of farmland they owned to Federal Land Bank as security for the loans. Id.
The Ahlers also obtained financing through several financing agreements with Norwest Bank of
Worthington (Norwest), which were executed between May 1982 and April 1984. Id. at 392. They
gave Norwest a second mortgage on the farmland, and a first mortgage on the machinery and
equipment, crops, livestock, and other farm proceeds. Id.
3. Id.
406 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 63:405
Two weeks later, the Ahlers filed a petition in the bankruptcy court
for reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.4
The petition included a plan for restructuring the debt and for
payment of that restructured debt. 5 In addition, the petition
automatically stayed the replevin proceedings.
6
Norwest filed motions for relief from the stay and for adequate
protection in order to protect itself from the value lost because it
was not able to immediately take possession of the collateral, sell it,
and reinvest the proceeds. 7 The Federal Land Bank of St. Paul
4. Id. at 393. The United States Bankruptcy Code is codified in title 11 of the United States
Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Chapter 11 of title 11 codifies
reorganization pursuant to the United States Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. 5§ 1101-1174 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). As of November 30, 1984, the Ahlers owed Federal Land Bank $540,118 and
Norwest $450,468 in principal and accrued interest. Ahlers, 794 F.2d app. at 412. The Ahlers also
owed $35,791 to John Deere Credit Corporation, secured by a combine, $3337 to the Community
Credit Corporation, secured by a grain bin, and $2900 to General Motors, secured by an
automobile. Id. at 392.
5. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393; see 11 U.S.C. 51123 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (plan shall be filed for
the treatment of the debtor's debts).
6. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393; see 11 U.S.C. 5 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Subsection 362(a)
provides, in relevant part:
[A] petition filed under... this title... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under
this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment
obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate
or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax
Court concerning the debtor.
Id. The purpose of the automatic stay is to protect debtors and creditors. See H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 [hereinafter HousE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5963, 6296-97. For a discussion of how the automatic stay protects creditors and debtors, see
infra note 20 and accompanying text.
7. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393. A court may grant relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 5 362(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Subsection 362(d)
provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay -
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this
section, if-
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(Federal Land Bank), which held a first mortgage on the Ahlers'
farmland, filed similar motions for relief. 8 The bankruptcy court
stated that Norwest and Federal Land Bank, as undersecured
creditors, were entitled to adequate protection as compensation for
the delay in repossession and foreclosure during the interim
between the filing of the petition for reorganization and the
confirmation of the plan. 9 The court then determined that the
creditors were entitled to adequate protection in the form of
monthly payments of interest on the current value of the
collateral. 10 The court stated that the Ahlers had to make these
(A) the debtor does not have any equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
Id. Alternatively, a court may require the debtor to provide adequate protection to creditors
pursuant to S 361 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. S 361 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 361
provides, in relevant part:
When adequate protection is required under . . . this title of an interest of an
entity in property, such adequate protection may be provided by -
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to
such entity, to the extent that the stay under ... this title, use, sale, or lease under...
this title, or any grant of a lien under ... this title results in a decrease in the value of
such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that
such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the value of such entity's
interest in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensation
allowable under . . . this title as an administrative expense, as will result in the
realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such
property.
Id. In Ahlers the court of appeals stated that adequate protection payments are designed to place the
secured creditor in essentially the same position it would have been in, absent the debtor's bank-
ruptcy filing. 794 F.2d at 395; see House RFPORT, supra note 6 at 339, 1978 U.S. Cone CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs at 6295. For a discussion of adequate protection, see infra notes 21-48 and
accompanying text.
8. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393. In addition to the Federal Land Bank's first mortgage on the Ahlers'
real property, Norwest had a second mortgage on the property. Id. at 392. Prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, neither Federal Land Bank nor Norwest had started foreclosure proceedings on
the Ahlers' real property. Brief of the States of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota and South Dakota in Opposition to the Petition for Rehearing and Suggestin for
Rehearing En Banc at X, Ahlers v. Norwest Bank (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 19861, cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (U.S.June 23, 1987) (No. 86-958) [hereinafter Brief of the States].
9. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 392-93, (citing In re Ahlers, No. 3-84-2206, slip op. at 5 (Bankr. Minn.
Mar. 15, 1985)). Norwest and Federal Land Bank were undersecured creditors because their claims
against the Ahlers exceeded the value of collateral held by the creditors as security for the debt. See id.
They were secured to the extent of the value of the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) (creditor
has a secured claim for the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim to the extent that their
claim exceeds the value of the collateral). They were unsecured to the extent that their claims
exceeded the value of the collateral. See id. The bankruptcy court determined that Norwest and
Federal Land Bank were entitled to adequate protection of the secured portion of the claims against
the debtors. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395.
10. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393. Subsection 361(1) of the Bankruptcy Code establishes that adequate
protection may be provided in the form of periodic cash payments. II U.S.C. S 361(1) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). For the text of § 361(1), see supra note 7. In determining that the creditors were
entitled to adequate protection in' the form of interest on the value of the collateral, the court
reasoned that a secured creditor bargains for the right to take possession of the collateral and sell it in
the event the debtor defaults. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395 (citing Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American
Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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monthly payments in order to maintain the automatic stay."1
Furthermore, the court determined that Norwest and Federal Land
Bank were entitled to adequate protection payments as of the date
they filed for adequate protection. 12 The court then concluded that
the Ahlers did not have sufficient funds to provide monthly
adequate protection payments and granted the creditors' motions
for relief from the stay. 13
The Ahlers appealed this order to the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota and the district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision.' 4 The Ahlers then appealed the
federal district court's order to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.' 5 The Ahlers contended that the bankruptcy court erred in
granting Norwest and Federal Land Bank relief from the automatic
stay. 16 The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that
the starting date of adequate protection payments should not begin
until the date the creditor, absent bankruptcy filing, could have
taken possession of the collateral pursuant to state law, sold it to a
third party, and reinvested the proceeds. 17 In addition, the court
Adequate protection payments in the form of interest compensate the creditor to the extent that the
automatic stay has prevented him or her exercising his bargained for repossession rights. Id.
11. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (court shall grant
relief from the automatic stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection). For the text of 5
362(d)(1), see supra note 7.
12. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395.
13. Id. at 395. In determining whether the Ahlers had sufficient funds to make adequate
protection payments, the bankruptcy court determined that a lien on the following year's crops could
not constitute adequate protection. Id. Since the debtors could not otherwise provide the monthly
payments, the court granted the creditors' motions for relief from the automatic stay. See id.
14. Id. at 393. In addition to reviewing the bankruptcy court's order for relief from the stay, the
district court reviewed the Ahlers' reorganization plan. Id. The court concluded that, because the
plan had no reasonable prospect of success, it was unfeasible. Id. Therefore, the court denied
confirmation of the Ahlers' reorganization plan. Id.
15. Id. Prior to appealing the federal district court's order, the Ahlers removed Norwest's
replevin action from the state district court to the bankruptcy court. Id. Both parties stipulated that
the replevin action was a core proceeding, which could be heard and determined by the bankruptcy
court. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 157(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (upon consent of parties the district court may
refer proceedings to bankruptcy judge). Norwest then filed a motion with the bankruptcy court for
prejudgment seizure of the Ahlers' property. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393; see MINN. STAT. ANN. S 565.23
(West Supp. 1987) (court may order prejudgment seizure upon demonstration of probability of
success on merits by claimant). Thereafter, the bankruptcy court granted Norwest's motion for
prejudgment seizure. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 394. The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota affirmed this order, as well as the order lifting the stay. Id. The Ahlers appealed both
these orders to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id.
16. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393-94. In addition to contending that the bankruptcy court erred in
granting the creditors relief from the stay, the Ahlers contended that the Minnesota replevin statute
was unconstitutional and that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to rule on Norwest's
motion for prejudgment seizure pursuant to that statute. Id.; see MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 565.23 (West
Supp. 1987) (allowing a creditor to initiate a replevin action when a debtor fails to pay money on an
obligation). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, without discussion, held that the
bankruptcy court should not permit the prejudgment seizure of equipment and machinery necessary
to carry out the reorganization plan, even if the creditors offer to post a bond. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 392.
17. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395. The court of appeals noted that the bankruptcy court, in
determining the starting date for adequate protection payments, should "take account of the usual
time and expense involved in repossession and sale of collateral." Id. (quoting Crocker Nat'l Bank v.
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held that the debtor farmer's experience, knowledge, skills, and
labor were a valuable contribution to the reorganization and that
the debtor could participate in the reorganization plan to the extent
of his or her contribution, even though more senior claims were not
fully satisfied.' 8 Ahlers v. Norwest Bank (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (U.S. June 23,
1987) (No. 86-958).
A petition for reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code operates as an automatic stay of all
creditors' actions to enforce their liens against the debtor's
property. 19 The purpose of the automatic stay is to relieve the
debtor of the financial pressures that drove the debtor into
bankruptcy and to permit the debtor time to prepare a repayment
or reorganization plan. 20 The Bankruptcy Code counterbalances
these debtor relief provisions by providing creditors with certain
rights, including the secured creditor's right to adequate protection
of its interest in the debtor's property during the bankruptcy
proceedings. 21  Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code protects the
creditor's right to adequate protection by providing that a creditor
will be granted relief from the automatic stay if the creditor's
interest in property is not adequately protected. 22
Secured creditors have sought to protect various interests
pursuant to their adequate protection rights. 23 One of these
American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 435 n. 12 (9th
Cir. 1984)). The court reasoned that a creditor should not be compensated for a lost opportunity
until it has actually experienced that loss. See id.
18. Id. at 402-03. The court applied an exception to the "absolute priority" rule in allowing the
debtors, by contributing labor and management, to retain a property interest pursuant to the
reorganization plan even though the plan failed to fully provide for the more senior unsecured
creditors claims. Id. at 401-02; see 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (requiring that
unsecured creditors claims be fully satisfied before holders of ownership interests may retain any
property pursuantto the reorganization plan). For a discussion of the absolute priority rule, see infra
notes 50-84 and accompanying text.
19. See 11 U.S.C. S 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (petition for reorganization automatically
stays all creditors' proceedings to enforce their liens). For the text of § 362(a), see supra note 6.
• 20. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6 at 340, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6296-97.
In addition to protecting the debtor, the automatic stay protects creditors from each other by
preventing one creditor from rushing to enforce its claims to the detriment of the other creditors. Id.
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6297.
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (ways to provide adequate protection). For the
text of § 361, see supra note 7. Although adequate protection is not specifically defined in the
Bankruptcy Code, the purpose of adequate protection is to preserve the creditor's bargained for
value during the interim between the bankruptcy filing and confirmation of the reorganization plan.
See HOusE REPORT, supra note 6 at 339-40, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6295-96.
22. 11 U.S.C. 5 362(d)(1) (1982) (relief from the automatic stay shall be granted for cause,
including lack of adequate protection). For the text of 5 362(d)(1), see supra note 7. In addition to
providing relief from the automatic stay, courts can adequately protect creditors by requiring debtors
to make periodic payments to creditors, by giving creditors additional liens on the debtor's property,
or by providing creditors with other relief that will result in the creditors receiving the "indubitable
equivalent" of their interest in the debtor's property. 11 U.S.C. § 361. For the text of § 361, see supra
note 7.
23. See Anderson, Adequate Protection of Opportunity Cost After In re Briggs, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV.
765, 767 (1985-86) (a creditor's adequate protection right may protect the creditor's interest in
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interests is the creditor's opportunity costs, which is the creditor's
loss caused by the delay in repossession created by the automatic
stay. 24 Adequate protection of this interest is based on the theory
that a secured creditor bargains for the right to take possession of
the collateral and sell it in the event that the debtor defaults.
25
Because the automatic stay prevents the creditor from immediately
repossessing the collateral and selling it, the creditor loses the value
it would receive if it was allowed to liquidate the collateral and
reinvest the proceeds. 26 Thus, creditors assert that to the extent
they are damaged by being prevented from exercising their
foreclosure rights, they are entitled to adequate protection.
27
A number of. courts have ordered protection of creditors'
opportunity costs. 28 In Crocker National Bank v. American Mariner
Industries29 the creditor, Crocker National Bank, had a perfected
security interest in the debtor's machinery, equipment, and tools.
30
property from the sale, use, or lease of the property by the debtor); see, e.g., Martin v. United States
(In re Martin), 761 F.2d 472, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1985) (requiring the value of the secured creditor's
interest be adequately protected from the risks to that value resulting from the debtor's use of the
collateral). A court may also require a debtor to provide adequate protection for the holder of an
existing lien from subsequent liens of equal or greater seniority. Anderson, supra at 767-68; see, e.g.,
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Center Wholesale, Inc. (In re Center Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d
1440, 1450 (9th Cir. 1985) (permitting debtor to incur debt secured by a senior lien on encumbered
property only if adequate protection is provided to the existing secured creditor). In addition,
adequate protection may be granted during the automatic stay to protect against a decline in value of
the creditor's collateral. Anderson, supra at 768-69; see, e.g., Pistole v. Mellor (In re Mellor), 734 F.2d
1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing debtor's equity in estate as adequate protection against decline
in value of the creditor's collateral).
24. See Anderson, supra note 23 at 769; see, e.g., Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner
Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1984) (creditor is
entitled to compensation for the delay in exercising its foreclosure rights); Republic Bank Houston v.
Bear Creek Ministorage, Inc. (In re Bear Creek Ministorage), 49 Bankr. 454, 457 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1985) (secured creditors right to foreclosure entitled to adequate protection). But see Gen. Elec.
Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 987, 1002 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982) (debtor not entitled to adequate protection for delay in enforcing its foreclosure rights).
25. See Anderson, supra note 23, at 769. Adequate protection of creditor's opportunity costs is
based on the proposition that a secured creditor has an interest in the secured property over and
above the availability of that property for debt repayment. Id. The secured property represents
capital investment by the secured creditor. Id. When a debtor defaults on a loan, the creditor's
investment yields no return. Id. The secured creditor has an interest in taking his investment out of
the secured property by selling the property, reinvesting the proceeds, and receiving interest on the
new investment. Id. Since the automatic stay prevents the sale, the creditor is prevented from
asserting this interest. Id. To the extent the creditor is harmed by the delay, the debtor must provide
adequate protection. Id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 769.
28. See, e.g., Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436, 1440-41 (4th Cir.
1985) (creditor entitled to adequate protection for the delay in exercising its foreclosure rights); In re
Pulliam, 54 Bankr. 624, 625 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985) (same); In re Wolsky, 53 Bankr. 751, 755
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (same); In re Deeter, 53 Bankr. 623, 627 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) (same); In
re Cash Currency Exch., Inc., 52 Bankr. 577, 580 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (same); In re Bear Creek
Ministorage, Inc., 49 Bankr. 454, 456-57 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (same); In re Lilyerd, 49 Bankr.
109, 117 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (same); In re Cassavaugh, 44 Bankr. 726, 729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1984) (same); In re Nordyke, 43 Bankr. 856, 861 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1984) (same).
29. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
30. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus.,
Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 427 (9th Cir. 1984). In 1978, Crocker National Bank made a loan to American
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When the debtor filed a petition for reorganization, the automatic
stay prevented the creditor from repossessing the collateral,
liquidating it, and reinvesting the proceeds.31  The creditor
contended that, because of the delay in repossession, it was entitled
to adequate protection payments equal to the return it would have
received if it-could have liquidated the collateral and reinvested the
proceeds.32 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
that it must protect the creditor against this delay since the secured
creditor's bargain, the right to sell the collateral, was limited by the
automatic stay. 33 The court reasoned that it must try to compensate
the secured creditor for this loss in order that the secured creditor
obtain "in value essentially what he bargained for." 34 Therefore,
the court determined that Crocker National Bank was entitled to
compensation for the delay in enforcing its rights during the
interim between the filing of the petition for reorganization and the
confirmation of the plan. 3
5
Although a number of courts have allowed protection of
creditors' opportunity costs, some courts have adopted a restrictive
Mariner secured by a perfected security interest in virtually all of the debtor's assets. Id. at 427. At
thle time of the debtor's bankruptcy filing, American Mariner's debt to Crocker was approximately
$370,000, secured by collateral worth $110,000. Id.
31. Id. at 431. American Mariner's filing for reorganization prevented Crocker National Bank
from foreclosing on American Mariner's assets. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)
(bankruptcy filing operates as stay of all lien enforcement action). For the text of § 362(a), see supra
note 6.
32. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 427-28.
33. Id. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California had rejected
Crocker National Bank's contention that it was entitled to adequate protection to compensate it for
the delay in repossession. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American
Mariner Indus., Inc.), 10 Bankr. 711, 712 (Bankr., C.D. Cal. 1981). In making its determination,
the court noted that the Bankruptcy Code specifically provides interest to a secured creditor to the
extent that the collateral has a value greater than the amount of its claim. Id. at 712; see 11 U.S.C. S
506(b) (Supp. III 1985). The court reasoned, by negative implication, that Congress did not intend
for an undersecured creditor- to receive interest on its claim. American Mariner, 10 Bankr. at 712. In
reviewing the bankruptcy court's decision, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court's negative implication analysis, but affirmed the
bankruptcy court's denial of adequate protection for the present value of the undersecured creditor's
collateral. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus.,
Inc.), 27 Bankr. 1004, 1009 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). The appellate panel concluded that, since the
bankruptcy court had protected the collateral against depreciation, the value of the creditor's
collateral was adequately protected. Id. at 1010. In appealing the appellate panel's decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Crocker National Bank contended that the
focus of adequate protection was the value of its interest in the collateral, rather than merely the
value of the collateral. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 429. The creditor asserted that the present value
of that interest must be adequately protected. Id. The court of appeals determined that a secured
creditor's right to take possession of and sell collateral on a debtor's default constitutes an interest in
property. Id. at 435. In concluding that this interest must be protected, the court stated that Crocker
National Bank was entitled to compensation as adequate protection for the delay in enforcing the
creditor's foreclosure rights during the automatic stay. Id.
34. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431 (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6 at 339, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6295 (purpose of adequate protection is to insure that a secured
creditor receives in value essentially what he bargains for)).
35. Id. at 435.
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view of adequate protection of opportunity costs.16 In Lend Lease,
Inc. v. Briggs Transportation Co. 37 the debtor, Briggs Transportation,
filed a petition for reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 38  At the time of the debtor's filing, two
creditors, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and
Lend Lease, held security interests in the debtor corporation's
tandem-axle tractors and trailers.3 9 The automatic stay prevented
the secured creditors from foreclosing on their collateral. 40 The
creditors sought adequate protection to compensate for the delay in
enforcing their foreclosure rights. 41 Because Briggs opposed the
creditors' claims for adequate protection of their lost opportunity
costs, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota heard the
issue and determined that a debtor, as a matter of law, need not pay
adequate protection of opportunity costs.
42
Pursuant to the creditors' appeal, the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the bankruptcy
court's decision and concluded that the creditors were entitled, as a
matter of law, to adequate protection as compensation for the delay
in enforcing their foreclosure rights.4 3 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order
after it determined that a creditor is not always entitled to
36. See, e.g., Lend Lease, Inc. v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.), 780 F.2d 1339,
1350 (8th Cir. 1985) (adequate protection of opportunity costs question of fact to be determined by
bankruptcy judge); United States v. Peach State Distrib. Co. (In re Peach State Distrib. Co.), 58
Bankr. 873, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (same).
37. 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
38. Lend Lease, Inc. v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.), 780 F.2d 1339, 1340-41
(8th Cir. 1985); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (codifying reorganization
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code).
39. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1341. At the time Briggs Transportation filed for bankruptcy, General
Motors Acceptance held a perfected security interest in fifty tandem-axle tractors purchased by
Briggs Transportation. Id. at 1340-41. Lend Lease held a perfected security interest in 100 trailers
pursuant to a secured lease / purchase agreement with Briggs Transportation. Id.
40. Id; see 11 U.S.C. S 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (petition for reorganization operates as a
stay of all lien enforcement actions). For the text of § 362(a), see supra note 6.
41. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1341.
42. Lend Lease, Inc., v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.), 35 Bankr. 210, 216-17
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1983). In determining that a creditor is not entitled to adequate protection of
opportunity cost, the bankruptcy court construed adequate protection pursuant to the automatic stay
as an interim measure of protection to the creditor. Id. The court reasoned that adequate protection
of opportunity cost would result in compensation, rather than protection, for the creditor. See id. at
216. Therefore, the court concluded that adequate protection did not entail the payment of lost
opportunity cost. See id. at 217.
43. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1341. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
interpreted the Court of Appeal's for the Ninth Circuit adequate protection analysis in American
Mariner, which was filed after the bankruptcy court's decision. Id. The district court reasoned that,
when the secured creditor was prevented by the automatic stay from enforcing its foreclosure rights
against the collateral, the debtor and its unsecured creditors received a windfall because they were
still benefiting from the use of the secured creditor's money. Id. at 1350; see American Mariner, 734
F.2d at 435. Therefore, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling and determined that
creditors were entitled to adequate protection of opportunity costs as a matter of law. Briggs, 780 F.2d
at 1341.
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compensation for the delay in enforcing its foreclosure rights
caused by the automatic stay. 44 The court concluded that, although
adequate protection requires the court to protect the secured
creditor's claim by compensating the creditor for any loss of value
of the collateral, what constitutes adequate protection in a
particular case is a question of fact best left to the discretion of the
bankruptcy judge. 45 The court stated that adequate protection of
opportunity cost should be provided only when the bankruptcy
court believes adequate protection of opportunity cost is an
essential part of the secured creditor's bargain. 46 The court of
appeals noted several factors to be considered by the bankruptcy
court in its adequate protection determination, including whether
the creditor's claim is oversecured or undersecured, the quality of
the collateral, the length of the stay, the stability of the collateral,
the probability of the reorganization's success, and whether taxes
and other payments are being paid by the debtor. 47 The court
remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for determination of
whether GMAC and Lend Lease, in negotiating their loans with
Briggs, had considered compensation for foreclosure delays as part
of their bargains.
4 8
The secured creditor's value in the collateral is preserved
through adequate protection prior to confirmation of the
reorganization plan. 49 The reorganization plan is a proposal to the
bankruptcy court for restructuring the debt of the debtor and for
payment of that restructured debt.50 The proposal divides claims or
interests in the debtor's property into classes and specifies the
treatment of each class. 5' Classes may be composed of secured
creditors, unsecured creditors, or ownership interests in the
44. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1350-51. The court, after examining the statutory language and
legislative history of the adequate protection provisions, noted that bankruptcy courts should retain a
large amount of flexibility in adequate protection determinations. Id. at 1348. The court believed
that the most reasonable approach to the question of what interests should be adequately protected
was to refrain from shaping a rigid rule, and allow adequate protection questions to be determined
on a case-by-case basis. See id.
45. Id. at 1351.
46. Id. at 1349. The court stated that what constitutes the creditor's bargain is based on factors
which reved.l the creditor's reasonable expectations pursuant to extending credit to the debtor. Id.
For a nonexclusive list of factors to be used by the bankruptcy court in determining the creditor's
reasonable expectations, see infra text accompanying note 47.
47. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1349-50.
48. Seeid. at 1351.
49. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 435 (creditor entitled to compensation for the delay in
enforcing its rights during the interim between the petition and the confirmation of the plan). For a
discussion of adequate protection, see supra notes 21-48 and accompanying text.
50. See 11 U.S.C. 5 1123 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (plan shall be filed for the treatment of the
debtor's debts).
51. See id. 5 1123(a) (plan shall designate classes of claims and classes of interests and shall
specify treatment of any class).
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property. 52 The secured creditor's rights are superior to the
unsecured creditor's rights, and the unsecured creditor's rights are
superior to the holders of ownership interests. 53 Upon the debtor's
filing of the plan, the bankruptcy court will hold a hearing on the
confirmation of the plan.
54
A bankruptcy court will confirm the debtor's reorganization
plan if certain requirements are met. 55 An important requirement
is that classes of creditors whose interests are impaired must
consent to the plan. 56 However, even if there is a dissenting class of
impaired creditors, the court must confirm the plan if it finds that
the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable
with respect to the dissenting class of impaired creditors. 57 The
standards for determining whether the plan is fair and equitable
vary depending upon whether the dissenting class is composed of
secured creditors, unsecured creditors, or holders of ownership
interests .
5 8
52. Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L.
REV. 925, 929 (1980); see 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b) (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (identifying fair and
equitable standards for secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and holders of ownership interests).
For the text of 5 1129(b) (2), see infra note 58.
53. See Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899). Prior to codification of
the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court established that creditor's interests are a property right, to
which the creditor is entitled to be paid before the holders of ownership interests retain any property.
Id.
54. 11 U.S.C. 5 1128(1982) (bankruptcy court shall hold hearing on confirmation of plan).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (listing general prerequisites to
confirmation of a plan).
56. Id. 5 1129 (a) (8) (court shall confirm a plan only if each class has accepted the plan or is not
impaired under the plan). A class of claims is usually impaired if the plan alters the legal, equitable,
and contractual rights to which a holder of a claim is entitled. 11 U.S.C. §1124 (1982 & Supp. III
1985) (defining when a class of claims is impaired and providing exceptions to the definition of
impairment). Thus, a class is impaired if the plan does not provide for the full satisfaction of claims
within a class. See id.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (court may confirm the reorganization plan
notwithstanding dissenting impaired creditors if plan does not unfairly discriminate, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class). The statutory provisions that allow a plan to be affirmed over
the opposition of a dissenting class are commonly referred to as the "cram down" provisions.
Pachulski, supra note 52, at 927.
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Subsection 1129 (b) (2) provides as
follows:
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable
with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i) (I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or
transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such
claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such
holder's interests, in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is
subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such
liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on
proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
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The reorganization plan will be confirmed notwithstanding
the dissent of a class of secured creditors if one of three
requirements is satisfied. 59 First, the plan must provide that the
creditors retain a lien on the collateral securing the amount of their
allowed claims, and that they receive deferred cash payments equal
to the present value of the collateral. 60 Alternatively, the plan must
propose to sell the collateral and transfer the dissenting secured
parties' liens to the sale proceeds. 61 As another alternative, the plan
must provide that the dissenting secured creditors receive the
"indubitable equivalent" of their claims .62
With respect to a dissenting class of holders of ownership
interests, the reorganization plan must be confirmed if one of two
standards is satisfied. 63 First,, the plan must provide that each
holder of an ownership interest receive or retain property equal to
the allowed amount of its interest. 64 Alternatively, the plan must
provide that the holders of subordinate interests do not receive or
retain any property under the plan.
65
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of
such claims.
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or
retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such
class will not receive or retain under the plan or account of such junior claim or
interest any property.
(C) With respect to a class or interest-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class receive or
retain on account of such interest property of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any fixed liquidation
preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price to which
such holder is entitled, or the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class will
not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest any
property.
Id.
59. Id. S 1129(b) (2) (A). For the text of 5 1129(b) (2) (A), see supra note 58.
60. 11 U.S.C. 5 1129(b) (2) (A) (i). For the text of 5 1129 (b) (2) (A) (i), see supra note 58. See
also Pachulski, supra note 52, at 946 ("adequately collaterized secured creditor" entitled to present
value equal to the full amount of its allowed claim). The result required pursuant to 5 1129(b) (2) (A)
(i) depends upon whether a secured creditor is adequately collateralized. See Pachulski, supra note 52
at 946. For a detailed discussion of § 1129(b) (2) (A) (i), see id. at 946-48.
61. 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b) (2) (A) (ii). For the text of 5 1129(b)(2) (A) (ii), see supra note 58.
62. 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). For the text of 5 1129(b)(2)(A)Qii), see supra note 58. The
dissenting secured creditors will receive the "indubitable equivalent" of their claims if, for example,
the debtor abandons the collateral to the secured creditor or gives the creditor a lien on similar
collateral. Pachulski, supra note 52 at 949. Thus, this "indubitable equivalent" requirement could be
met by a reorganization plan providing for the sale of a secured creditor's collateral free from liens,
with a secured creditor's lien being transferred to other property owned by the debtor. Id.
63. See I1 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (C). For the text of § 1129 (b) (2) (C), see supra note 58.
Ownership interests include the interests of partners in a partnership, the interests of a sole
proprietor in a proprietorship, or the interests of stockholders in a corporation. 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1129.03 at 1129-40(15th ed. 1987).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (C) (i). For the text of 51129(b) (2) (C) (i), see supra note 58.
65. 11 U.S.C. 5 1129(b)(2)(C)(ii). For the text of 1129(b) (2) (C) (ii), see supra note 58. But see
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The fair and equitable standards with respect to a dissenting
class of unsecured creditors are similar to those for holders of
ownership interests. 66 First, the plan must provide that each
unsecured creditor receive or retain property equal to the allowed
amount of its claim. 67 Alternatively, the plan may provide that the
unsecured creditors receive little or no property or participation in
the plan, as long as holders of subordinate claims, such as holders of
ownership interests, do not receive or retain any property under the
plan.68 Thus, a dissenting class of unsecured creditors must be
provided for in full before any junior class can receive or retain any
property under the reorganization plan. 69
The "fair and equitable" provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
apply a relaxed version of the absolute priority rule to determine
the rights of unsecured creditors and holders of ownership
interests.70 Pursuant to the "absolute priority" rule, a class must
be fully satisfied before any subordinate class may retain any
interest in the debtor's property, whether or not the class dissents.
7
1
The Bankruptcy Code, on the other hand, permits senior classes
that accept the plan to give up value to subordinate classes,
provided no dissenting senior class receives less than the full
amount of its claim.
72
In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,73 however, the
United States Supreme Court noted an exception to the absolute
priority rule, allowing stockholders who provided new capital into
the reorganization plan to retain an ownership interest in the
debtor corporation, even though dissenting unsecured creditors
received less than their allowed claims. 74 In Case the debtor was a
Ahlers v. Norwest Bank ( In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388, 401 (8th Cir. 1986) (retention of ownership
interest by debtors did not prevent a reorganization plan from being "fair and equitable" pursuant
to S 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii)); Official Creditors' Comm. v. Potter Material Serv. (In re Potter Material
Serv.), 781 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1984) (stockholder could retain ownership interest even though
senior claims were not satisfied in full if the stockholder invests new capital in the corporation).
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (B). For the text of S 1129(b) (2) (B), see supra note 58.
67. 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b) (2) (B) (i). For the text of S 1129(b) (2) (B) (i), see supra note 58.
68. 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii). For the text of S 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii), see supra note 58.
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii). For the text of 5 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii), see supra note 58.
70. Klee, All You Ever Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 133, 143 (1979) (tests regarding unsecured claims and ownership interests apply
relaxed version of traditional absolute priority rule).
71. Id. at 143 n. 81; See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913) (creditors
must be paid before stockholders could retain property for any reason whatsoever).
72. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.03 at 1129-56. It is important to note that the
"absolute priority" rule of the Bankruptcy Code applies only when an impaired class of unsecured
claims or ownership interests does not accept the plan. Id.
73. 308 U.S. 106(1939).
74. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939). The Court reasoned
that it is often necessary to obtain new capital for the successful reorganization of a corporation. See
id. (citing Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926)).
Thus, the Court concluded that stockholders must be allowed to retain an interest in the debtor
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holding company that owned virtually all of the outstanding shares
of the capital of six subsidiaries.75 Claims by creditors against the
debtor were four times greater than the debtor's assets. 76 The
insolvent debtor corporation filed a reorganization plan, which
proposed that the stockholders retain twenty-three percent of the
value of the enterprise. 7 7 The creditors objected to the plan because
it did not provide for full satisfaction of their claims and yet allowed
the stockholders, whose interests were subordinate to the creditor's
claims, to retain an interest in the debtor corporation.
78
In considering the proposed reorganization plan, the Court
stressed that securing new money was essential to the success of the
plan. 79 The Court stated that when new money is needed and the
old stockholders make a fresh contribution, receiving in return an
ownership interest in the debtor corporation, creditors may not
object to the plan.80 The Court emphasized that the stockholders'
retained interest must be based on a contribution in money or
money's worth, in order to assure that the creditor's priority right
would not be diluted by inadequate stockholder contributions.
81
The contribution offered in Case was the stockholders' financial
standing and influence in the community, and the continuity of
management. 82 The Court determined that, on the facts of the
corporation, or they would not be willing to contribute the new capital that the debtor corporation
requires. See id.
75. Id. at 109. Of the six subsidiary corporations in which the debtor held stock, only one had
assets of substantial value. Id.
76. Id. at 119. The debtor's assets were worth approximately $900,000 while claims against the
debtor totaled approximately $3,800,000. Id. Thus, even if all of the debtor's assets were turned over
to the creditors, less than 25 % of the creditor's claims would be satisfied. Id.
77. Id. The debtor's liabilities consisted of first lien mortgage bonds secured by a trust indenture
covering the assets of one subsidiary, and the stock of the other subsidiaries. Id. at 109. Pursuant to
the reorganization plan, 1,000,000 shares of stock would be issued. Id. at 111. The bondholders were
to receive some of the stock at a rate of 250 shares for each $1000 bond. Id. Stock was also to be issued
to prior stockholders free of charge. Id.
78. Id. at 112. Some of the bondholders objected to the plan on the basis that it was not "fair and
equitable" to bondholders, because the plan did not provide for full satisfaction of their claims and
yet allowed the stockholders to retain an interest in the corporation. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. 5 1129(b) (1)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (court may confirm the reorganization plan notwithstanding dissenting
impaired creditors if the plan does not unfairly discriminate, and is fair and equitable, with respect to
each class).
79. Case, 308 U.S. at 121. The court noted that new money was necessary for effective
reorganizations to provide the debtor with new working capital and to allow the debtor to pay
dissenting creditors. Id. at n. 15.
80. Id. at 121.
81. Id. at 122.
82. Id. The court determined that the stockholders' ability to provide continuity of
management, their financial standing and their influence in the community were too intangible to
measure in money's worth. Id. In regard to these contributions the court stated: "They have no
place in the asset column of the balance sheet of the new company. They reflect merely vague hopes
or possibilities. As such, they can not be the basis for issuance of stock to otherwise valueless
interests." Id. at '122-23. In addition, the court noted that these intangible contributions, if
recognized as adequate consideration for the issuance of stock to holders of junior interests, would
operate as easy evasions of the absolute priority rule. Id. at 122.
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case, these contributions could not possibly be translated into
money's worth.8 3  Therefore, the Court concluded that the
stockholders' consideration was insufficient to justify a retained
interest pursuant to the contribution exception to the absolute
priority rule. 
8 4
In decisions subsequent to Case, courts have recognized that,
in certain circumstances, shareholders may participate in the
reorganized enterprise.85 Shareholders' contributions of capital
necessary to fund the reorganization plan have been deemed
sufficient to allow shareholders to participate in the reorganization
of the corporation.. 86 Courts have also indicated that the issuance of
stock to key personnel involved in the management of an enterprise
might not violate the absolute priority rule when the continuation
of management is essential to the success of the reorganization. 87
These decisions reflect a practical adjustment of the priority rights
of creditors and stockholders.8 8
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expanded this
exception to the absolute priority rule in Ahlers v. Norwest Bank.89
Prior to discussing the absolute priority rule, however, the court in
Ahlers analyzed the elements of adequate protection.9" The Ahlers'
filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition resulted in an automatic
stay of all creditors' lien actions against the Ahlers' property. 91
Norwest and Federal Land Bank, because their claims against the
Ahlers greatly exceeded the value of the Ahlers' land and




85. See, e.g., Buffalo Sav. Bank v. Marston Enter. Inc. (In re Marston Enter.), 13 Bankr. 514,
518 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) ($300,000 to $400,000 contribution by stockholders to effectuate
reorganization plan could be sufficient to allow shareholder participation).
86. See, e.g., Official Creditor's Comm. v. Potter Material Serv., Inc. (In re Potter Material
Serv. Inc.), 781 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1986) (sole shareholder retained interest in exchange for
contributing capital and renewing personal guarantee of debtor's note); Brown v. Brown's Indus.
Uniforms, Inc. (In re Brown's Indus. Uniforms, Inc.), 58 Bankr. 139, 141 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985)
(plan confirmed when shareholder contributed personal assets for working capital).
87. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Kaplan, 193 F.2d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946
(1952). In Horowitz, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization, which provided two managers with an option to purchase a portion of the common
stock of the corporate debtor. Id. at 74. The court determined that the two managers' skills were an
important assurance of the debtor's future success. Id. The court based its findings on the fact that
the two managers had agreed by contract to remain in the management positions for a five year
period. Id.
88. See Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926)
(advocating bankruptcy court's discretion in adjusting the rights of priority).
89. 794 F.2d 388, 401 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (June 23, 1987) (No. 86-
958).
90. Ahlers v. Norwest Bank (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d at 393-97 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55
U.S.L.W. 3852 (June 23, 1987) (No. 86-958).
91. Id. at 393; see I 1 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (bankruptcy filing operates as stay
of all lien enforcement actions). For the text of S 362(a), see supra note 6.
92. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 392.
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As a result of the automatic stay, the creditors were unable to
foreclose on the Ahlers' property so they sought adequate
protection.
93
The first issue the court discussed was the starting date of
adequate protection payments for opportunity cost. 94 The
bankruptcy court determined that the undersecured creditors were
entitled to adequate protection payments as of the date they filed
for adequate protection. 95 The court of appeals reversed the
bankruptcy court, stating that adequate protection payments
should not begin until, pursuant to state law, the secured creditor
could have taken possession of the collateral, sold it to a third party,
and reinvested the proceeds. 
96
Pursuant to Minnesota law, a creditor must give six weeks
published notice prior to a foreclosure sale of a debtor's real
property. 97 In addition, the debtor has an exclusive statutory right
to redeem the realty for twelve months following the foreclosure
sale. 98 During this redemption period, the mortgagor is entitled to
possession, rents, and profits of the real estate. 99 Therefore, it is
93. Id. at 393; see 11 U.S.C. S 361(l) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (when adequate protection is
required it may be provided by periodic payments). For the text of 5 361(1), see supra note 7. In
addition to motioning for adequate protection, the creditors requested relief from the automatic stay.
Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393; see 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(1) (relief may be granted from the automatic stay for
cause, including lack of adequate protection). For the text of S 362(d)(1), see supra note 7.
94. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395. The court of appeals stated that, although a secured creditor should
receive adequate protection of its interest during an automatic stay, what constitutes adequate
protection depends on the unique facts presented in each individual case. Id. at 394. (citing In re
Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1348 (8th Cir. 1985)). For a discussion of Briggs, see supra notes 37-48 and
accompanying text. The court of appeals then noted that Norwest and Federal Land Bank were
entitled to adequate protection of their security interest, and that protection may include
compensation, in the form of postpetition interest payments, for the delay in enforcing their
foreclosure rights. Id. at 395. Therefore the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in
requiring the Ahlers to make postpetition payments, and turned to the question of the timing and
amount of the adequate protection payments. Id.
95. Id. The bankruptcy court determined that Federal Land Bank was entitled to adequate
protection payments as ofJanuary 1, 1985, the date of the Ahlers' postpetition default on the Federal
Land Bank loans. Id. The bankruptcy court also determined that Norwest was entitled to protection
payments as of February 27, 1985, the date of the evidentiary hearing on Norwest's motion for
adequate protection. Id.
96. Id. at 395. The court of appeals noted that before a bankruptcy court determines the time
period it would take a creditor to repossess, sell, and reinvest collateral, it must determine the date to
which this period would be added. Id. The court of appeals determined that if the secured creditor
has commenced foreclosure proceedings prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the foreclosure
delays should be added to the date foreclosure proceedings were commenced. Id. If, however, the
secured creditor has not commenced foreclosure proceedings prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, the foreclosure delays should be added to the date that the creditor moved for adequate
protection in the bankruptcy court. Id.
97. See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 580.03 (West 1947) (six weeks published notice must be given prior
to a foreclosure sale).
98. See id. 5 580.23(2) (West Supp. 1987) (mortgagor may redeem twelve months after
foreclosure sale); see also id. S 580.24 (if mortgagor does not redeem within twelve months, the senior
creditor having a lien on the mortgaged property may redeem).
99. See Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1012, 1013 (1984) (mortgager entitled to retain rights to possession, rents, and property during the
redemption period).
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extremely unlikely that a third party would purchase the property
until after the redemption period. 00 Applying these principles, the
court in Ahlers noted that Norwest's and Federal Land Bank's rights
to foreclose and to reinvest the liquidation proceeds would give
them no financial benefit until the land could be resold to a third
party, which at the earliest would be one year and six weeks from
the date the foreclosure proceedings were commenced. 10 1 The court
concluded that adequate protection payments, with respect to the
farmland, should not begin until that day.1
0 2
The court then considered when adequate protection
payments should begin for creditors with an interest in the Ahlers'
farm machinery and equipment. 0 3  The court noted that
Minnesota law provides that a creditor, absent bankruptcy filing, is
permitted to take possession of farm machinery and equipment
secured as collateral without any significant delay. 10 4 Therefore,
the court determined that adequate protection payments, with
respect to the Ahlers' farm machinery and equipment, should
begin promptly after the secured creditors apply for adequate
protection. 1
05
The next issue the court discussed was the date that the
collateral should be valued for adequate protection purposes.
10 6
100. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396. The court noted that pursuant to reasonable and established
marketing techniques, the creditor will purchase the realty at the foreclosure sale and then attempt to
resell the property after the redemption period has expired, provided that the debtor has not
exercised his or her redemption rights. Id.
101. Id. The court stated that if foreclosure proceedings had not been commenced prior to the
bankruptcy filing, then adequate protection payments would begin one year and six weeks after the
adequate protection motion was filed by the creditor. Id. For a discussion of the dates from which the
redemption period would run for the purpose of adequate protection payments, see supra note 96.
Norwest and Federal Land Bank had not commenced foreclosure proceedings prior to the date that
the Ahlers filed for bankruptcy. Brief of the States, supra note 8, at X. Thus, the Ahlers' adequate
protection payments would begin one year and six weeks after Norwest and the Federal Land Bank
filed their motions for adequate protection. SeeAhlers, 794 F.2d at 396.
102. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see MINN. STAT. ANN. S 565.21 (West Supp. 1987) (claimant can recover possession of
personal property prior to final judgment). The court noted that Norwest would be permitted to
repossess the Ahlers' farm equipment and machinery unless the Ahlers were dependent on the
property to earn a living. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 565.251 (West Supp. 1987)
(debtor can stay the creditor from repossession if the debtor insures the property and makes periodic
depreciation payments to the creditor). The court stated that in the event the debtor needed the
property for a living, the debtor could only retain the property if he insured it and made periodic
payments to the creditor, similar to those required under the Bankruptcy Code. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at
396; see 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985). For the text of § 361(1), see supra note 7.
Therefore, the court concluded that adequate protection payments for farm equipment and
machinery should start on application for adequate protection. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396.
105. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396. The court added that since secured collateral like livestock and
grain in storage may be readily liquidated, adequate protection payments on these items should also
begin on the date of application for adequate protection payments. Id.
106. Id. Congress specifically left open the question of the valuation date of collateral for
adequate protection payments. Id. at 395; see HousE REPORT, supra note 6 at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6295. The purpose of leaving the determination of valuation open was to
permit the bankruptcy court to adapt to varying circumstances and changing modes of financing. Id.
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The bankruptcy court had determined that the valuation should be
fixed as of the date the Ahlers filed for bankruptcy.10 7 The court of
appeals reversed the bankruptcy court's decision, concluding that
the date of valuation should match the starting date of the adequate
protection payments. 108 Therefore, the collateral should be valued
at the time it could have been sold pursuant to state law. 109
The court then addressed the timing of the periodic protection
payments. 110  The bankruptcy court had required morithly
adequate protection payments as a condition to maintaining the
automatic stay on all creditor proceedings. 111 The court of appeals,
however, reversed the bankruptcy court's decision, determining
that the timing of the payments should consider the nature of the
debtor's income.' 12 A farmer's income is not dependent upon a
monthly paycheck, but rather upon the cyclical nature of
agriculture." 3 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that adequate
protection payments in this particular case should not be due until
the Ahlers had harvested their crops and had sold their livestock.
114
107. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396.
108. See id. For a discussion of the starting dates for adequate protection payments, see supra
notes 94-105 and accompanying text. The court stated that the bankruptcy court's determination of
the valuation was appropriate with respect to the livestock and grain in storage which, pursuant to
state law, could have been sold immediately. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396; see MINN. STAT. ANN. S 565.21
(West Supp. 1987) (creditor possession of personal property prior to final judgment). However, the
bankruptcy court's decision was inappropriate with respect to the real property collateral that could
not have been sold immediately, since the adequate protection payments would not begin until the
collateral could have been sold. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396; see MINN. STAT. ANN. S 580.03 (West 1947)
(six weeks published notice must be given prior to foreclosure sale); id. § 580.23 (West Supp. 1987)
(mortgagor may redeem twelve months after foreclosure sale).
109. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396. For a discussion of when collateral can be sold pursuant to state
law, see supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. The court stated that even if it ignored the
bankruptcy court's error of valuing the collateral at the time of the filing of the petition, the court
would still remand the issue of valuation to the bankruptcy court because the bankruptcy court had
failed to consider the dramatic decline in land values that had occurred in the twelve month period
preceeding the filing of the petition. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396-97.
110. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 397.
111. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (when adequate protection is required,
adequate protection can be provided by periodic payments). For the text of § 361(1), see stpra note 7.
The adequate protection payments were required in order to compensate Norwest and Federal Land
Bank for the delay in exercising their foreclosure rights caused by the automatic stay. Ahlers, 794 F.2d
at 393.
112. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 397.
113. Id. The court noted that a grain farmer's income is not dependent upon a monthly
paycheck, but rather upon the harvest of his or her crops at the end of the growing season. Id.
Similarly, a livestock farmer's income is realized when the livestock is sold. Id.
114. Id. The court stated that, although adequate protection payments should not be due until
harvest is completed and livestock are sold, the adequate protection payments could be accumulated
prior to the harvest. Id. at 397 n.11.
The court also reviewed whether a lien on growing crops could be sufficient as adequate
protection. Id. at 397. The court determined that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that the
Ahler's offer of a lien on the next year's crop could not constitute adequate protection. Id. The court
reaffirmed its holding in a prior decision that a lien on a future crop, to the extent that the crop was
otherwise not encumbered, may serve in whole or in part as a basis for providing adequate
protection. Id.; see Martin v. United States (In re Martin), 761 F.2d 472, 476-78 (8th Cir. 1985).
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Next, the court examined Norwest's and Federal Land Bank's
contentions that any feasible plan submitted by the Ahlers could
not be confirmed over the banks' objections. 115 The creditors
alleged that, because they were undersecured, any reorganization
plan would treat part of their claims as unsecured.1 1 6 The creditors
contended that they would object to any reorganization plan
because the Ahlers were not financially able to produce a plan that
would provide for full payment of the creditors' unsecured
claims. 1 7 Moreover, Norwest and Federal Land Bank argued that
the plan could not be confirmed over their objections because the
plan would not fully satisfy their unsecured claims and the debtors
would retain an interest in the farm by being allowed to continue
the farming operation. 8 The creditors maintained that such a plan
115. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399-400. Prior to reaching the confirmation issues, the court reviewed
whether the Ahlers' reorganization plan had a reasonable prospect of success. Id. at 397-99. Norwest
and Federal Land Bank contended that even if their interests were adequately protected during the
automatic stay, they should be granted relief from the stay because the Ahlers' reorganization plan
was not feasible. Id. at 397. Norwest and Federal Land Bank based their argument on § 362(d)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that the automatic stay will be lifted, if the debtor does not
have equity in the collateral and the collateral is "not necessary to an effective reorganization." Id.;
see 11 U.S.C. 5 362(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For the text of § 362(d)(2), see supra note 7.
Norwest and Federal Land Bank argued that the "necessary for an effective reorganization"
language of S 362(d)(2) required the Ahlers' to show not only that the property was essential to the
reorganization plan, but also that the plan was realistically feasible. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 397-98.
The district court had reviewed the reorganization plan based on several factors and had found
that the plan was utterly unfeasible. Id. at 398. The court analyzed the plan, using the factors
outlined in United Properties, Inc. v. Emporium Dept. Stores. Id.; see United Properties, Inc. v. Emporium
Dept. Stores, Inc., 379 F.2d 55, 66-71 (8th Cir. 1967) (outlining the following factors: (1) the ratio of
current assets to current liabilities; (2) the debtor's solvency; (3) evidence that the debtor could
operate at a profit; (4) the debtor's cash flow; (5) the capability of the debtor's management; and (6)
economic conditions affecting the debtor's situation). Based on these factors, the district court
determined that the Ahlers' plan was unfeasible because the debtor's current liabilities exceeded his
current assets by a substantial margin and the debtor could not, in light of his past experience and
current or anticipated farm programs, be expected to operate profitably. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 398. The
court of appeals reversed the district court's decision after it determined that the district court failed
to value the collateral independent of the bankruptcy court's valuation of the collateral for adequate
protection purposes. Id. The appeals court stated that for purposes of the feasibility of the
reorganization plan, collateral should be valued at the time of confirmation of the plan, and not at
the time collateral is valued for adequate protection purposes. See id. For a discussion of the time
collateral is valued for adequate protection purposes, see supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
The appeals court noted that revaluation is particularly important when, as in the Ahlers' case, the
evidence demonstrated that the collateral decreased in value after the adequate protection valuation.
Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 398. Therefore, the court remanded the issue of valuation to the district court for
revaluation of the collateral as of the plan's confirmation date, and ordered the district court to make
a new determination of the reorganization plan's feasibility. See id.
116. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399; see 11 U.S.C. S 506(a) (1982) (a creditor has a secured claim to the
extent of the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the amount that his allowed claim
exceeds the value of the collateral).
117. "ders, 794 F.2d at 399; see U.S.C. S 1129(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (court will confirm
a plan only when a class of creditors has accepted the plan or the class of creditors is not impaired
under the plan); id. § 1124 (a class of claims is impaired when the plan alters the legal, equitable and
contractual rights to which a holder of a claim is entitled).
118. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399; see 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (court may
confirm the reorganization plan notwithstanding dissenting impaired creditors if the plan is fair and
equitable with respect to each class); id. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (a plan is fair and equitable if, pursuant to
the absolute priority rule, unsecured claims are provided for in full before the holder of any junior
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would violate the absolute priority rule contained in the
Bankruptcy Code's "fair and equitable" provisions. 119 The Ahlers,
however, sought to avoid this requirement pursuant to the
contribution exception to the absolute priority rule by offering new
consideration to the reorganization plan. 
120
The court of appeals addressed for the first time the issue of
whether a farmer's efforts in operating and managing his or her
farm are a contribution sufficient to allow the debtor farmer to
retain an interest in the farm. 121 Relying on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,
the court stated that the new contribution must be in money or
money's worth. 122 The contribution that the Ahlers offered was the
labor and management skills that they possessed as farmers. 123 The
court determined that the yearly contribution of the farmer's efforts
in operating the farm was measurable in money's worth. 124
Furthermore, acknowledging that the new contribution must be
essential to the success of the undertaking, the court stated that a
farmer's efforts in operating and managing his or hei farm were
essential to any farm reorganization. 125 Thus, the court concluded
that the Ahlers should be entitled to retain an interest in the farm in
return for the labor contribution, even though more senior claims
were not provided for in full under the plan. 126
claims or interests retains any property owned by the debtor). For the text of S 1129(b)(2)(B), see
supra note 58. Norwest and Federal Land Bank argued that under any reorganization plan, the
Ahlers would retain an ownership interest because they would continue to farm their land. Ahlers,
794 F.2d at 401. The creditors maintained that the retention of the ownership interest would violate
the absolute priority rule because ownership interests are junior to unsecured claims, and the
unsecured claims would not be fully satisfied. Id. at 401.
119. See supra note 118. For a discussion of the "fair and equitable" provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code and the "absolute priority" rule, see supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
120. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121
(1939) (an ownership interest may be retained when unsecured claims are not satisfied in full if the
holder of the ownership interest makes a fresh contribution to the debtor in money or money's
worth). For a discussion of Case, see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
121. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402.
122. Id. at 401 (citing Case, 308 U.S. at 122) (a contribution must be made in money or money's
worth to retain an ownership interest when unsecured creditors are not paid in full). For a discussion
of Case, see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
123. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402.
124. Id. The court noted that the Ahlers' skills are something of a value that would disappear if
their farm were liquidated. Id. Since the value of the Ahlers' skill could not be realized by creditors in
the event of liquidation, the court noted that principles of fairness were not violated if the
reorganization plan left that value in their hands. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the
reorganization value of the Ahlers' farm exceeded its liquidation value. Id. Norwest and Federal
Land Bank would receive annual payments if the plan was approved and was successful, but they
would receive nothing if the plan was rejected and the Ahlers were forced to liquidate their farm. Id.
125. Id. at 402; see Case, 308 U.S. at 121 (the contribution made by the holder of an ownership
interest must be necessary to the reorganization for the holder of the ownership interest to retain an
interest when senior claim holders have not been satisfied). For a discussion of Case, see supra notes
73-84 and accompanying text.
126. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402; see 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (a plan is
fair and equitable if, pursuant to the absolute priority rule, unsecured claims are provided for in full
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The court then discussed whether the Ahlers' labor
contribution was reasonably equivalent to the ownership interest
that they would retain pursuant to the reorganization plan. 127 The
court stated that, in determining the worth of the farmer's retained
interest in the property, a court must estimate the future worth of
the debtor's farm and any potential profits. 128 The court noted that
the Ahlers would not realize any value from their retained interest,
other than farm operating costs and living expenses, until the
reorganization plan was completed, since all profits from the farm
operation would be paid to the creditors until the creditors had
been paid in full.1 29 The court stated that if the value of the Ahlers'
yearly contributions of labor, experience, and expertise over the life
of the reorganization plan would equal or exceed the value of the
retained ownership interest when the plan is completed, then
unsecured creditors would have been accorded their full right of
priority against the debtors' assets. 1
30
In summary, the court in Ahlers narrowed the scope of
adequate protection of opportunity costs during bankruptcy
proceedings. 131 Pursuant to the court's decision, the starting date
for adequate protection payments should not begin until the date
before the holder of any junior claims or interests retains any property under the plan). For the text
of 5 1 129(b)(2)(B)(ii), see supra note 58.
127. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402. The court had to determine whether the Ahlers' labor contribution
was reasonably equivalent to the ownership interest he would retain because, pursuant to the
contribution exception to the absolute priority rule set forth in Case, the contribution must be
reasonably equivalent to the ownership interest that is retained. See Case, 308 U.S. at 121. For a
discussion of the contribution exception in Case, see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
128. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402 (citing In re Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788, 792-93 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1981) (the court must make determinations regarding the future of the debtor as
reorganized and its possible profits). The court noted that determining the value of the farmer's
contribution should not be difficult to determine. Id. However, the court viewed the valuation of the
farmer's retained interest as a more difficult problem. Id.
129. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 403. The court noted that since the Ahlers would not receive any profit
or benefit until the plan was complete, their ownership interest did not mature until the plan was
finished. Id.
130. Id. For example, if the bankruptcy court values the farmer's labor, experience, and
expertise at $40,000 per year, and the plan provides for living expenses of $12,000 per year, the
farmer's contribution for his retained ownership interest would be $28,000 per year. Id. at n. 17. This
$28,000 multiplied by the number of years a reorganization plan spans equals the amount the farmer
has paid for his retained ownership interest. See id. If this amount exceeds the value of the farmer's
retained ownership interest at the time the plan is completed, the unsecured creditors have been
afforded their full rights of priority against the debtor. Id. at 403.
Moreover, the court noted that a plan may be more profitable than anticipated, and if the holder
of the ownership interest receives this profit, the holder may receive more than the value of its
contribution. Id. The court suggested, in order to avoid this result, that the bankruptcy court should
require that the excess profit from the operation of the farm be paid to the unsecured creditors on a
pro rata basis until the secured creditors have been paid in full without interest. Id. In addition, if
any secured property is sold during the life of the plan, and if the unsecured creditors have not been
paid in full, the bankruptcy court should require that any amount received in excess of that necessary
to pay any secured creditors be shared equitably among the unsecured creditors and the holders of
ownership interests, based on their contribution at the time the property is sold. Id.
131. See id. at 393-97. For a discussion of adequate protection of opportunity costs, see supra
notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
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when the secured creditor, acting pursuant to state law, could have
taken possession of the collateral, sold it to a third party, and
reinvested the proceeds. 132 In addition, the court expanded the
contribution exception to the absolute priority rule to permit a
debtor farmer to participate in a reorganization plan in
consideration for his or her contribution of experience, knowledge,
and labor to the plan. 1
33
In his dissent, Judge Gibson contended that the majority
ignored the bankruptcy court's discretionary authority and failed to
review the bankruptcy court's factual findings under the "clearly
erroneous" standard. 134 Gibson also contended that the majority's
view that experience, knowledge, and labor is equivalent to capital
was contrary to precedent, logic, and fairness. 135 Gibson concluded
that this adjustment in the relationship between the debtor farmer
and his or her creditors involved policy considerations that should
be addressed by Congress rather than the courts. 136
The Ahlers decision redefines the manner in which a creditor's
opportunity costs may be adequately protected during the stay in
bankruptcy proceedings. 137 In In re Roberts138 the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed
and questioned the Ahlers decision. 139 In Roberts undersecured
132. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395. For a discussion of the starting date of adequate protection
payments, see supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
133. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399, 403. For a discussion of the contribution exception to the
absolute priority rule, see supra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
134. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 404 (Gibson, J., dissenting). Judge Gibson asserted that the majority
ignored factual and equitable considerations properly relied upon by the bankruptcy judge in
ordering the commencement of adequate protection payments. Id.
135. Id. at 406. Judge Gibson maintained that the contribution exception to the absolute rule
should be narrowly construed to allow a debtor to participate in the reorganization plan only when
the debtor makes a fresh capital contribution or its equivalent which is necessary to the
reorganization plan. Id. In his view, the majority's expansion of the rule to include a contribution of
labor was not supported by case law. Id. at 407.
Judge Gibson also asserted that the court's reasoning was illogical, Id. Judge Gibson contended
that a contribution of labor did not provide the same certain protection to the unsecured creditor as
did a contribution of capital. Id, In addition, Judge Gibson argued that the value of a farmer's
experience, knowledge, and labor was too speculative compared to the value of capital. Id.
Furthermore, Judge Gibson noted that a contribution of capital was made prior to the execution of
the plan, whereas the contribution of labor was a promise to perform in the future. Id. Finally, Judge
Gibson maintained that the expansion of the absolute priority rule to include labor as a sufficient new
contribution to allow debtor participation violated the "fair and equitable" requirement of the
absolute priority rule. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. S 1 129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (a plan is fair
and equitable, if, pursuant to the absolute priority rule, unsecured claims are provided for in full
before the holder of any junior claims or interests retains any property under the plan). For the text
of 5 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), see supra note 58. He reasoned that, because an agreement to contribute labor
was not sufficient to allow a debtor to retain an interest under the plan, the plan was not fair and
equitable. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 407 (Gibson,J., dissenting).
136. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 408 (Gibson,J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 395. The court determined that adequate protection payments should not begin
until the date when the creditor could have repossessed and liquidated the collateral. Id. For a
discussion of the court's analysis of adequate protection, see supra notes 90-114 and accompanying
text.
138. 63 Bankr. 372 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
139. In re Roberts, 63 Bankr. 372, 381 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
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creditors sought adequate protection of their interests in the debtor
farmers' real property after the debtors filed for reorganization
pursuant to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.14 0 The bankruptcy
court disagreed with the Ahlers holding that the starting date for
adequate protection payments should not begin until the date when
the creditor could have taken possession of the property pursuant to
state law, sold it to a third party, and reinvested the proceeds.
141
Instead, the bankruptcy court concluded that adequate protection
must be provided from the time that the undersecured creditors
moved for relief.142 The court reasoned that if adequate protection
is not required until after the date when the creditor could have,
absent bankruptcy filing, taken possession of and liquidated the
collateral and the debtor fails to make a payment at that time, the
creditor would only then be able to institute foreclosure
proceedings. 143 This would, in effect, double the time that the
creditor must wait to obtain title to the property. 1
44
The Ahlers decision also expands the contribution exception to
the absolute priority rule by allowing a farmer to participate in a
reorganization plan by operating his or her farm. 145 In In re
Stegall146 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central
District of Illinois criticized the Ahlers decision. 14 7 In Stegall the
debtor farmers filed a plan of reorganization pursuant to chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code.148 The debtors sought to retain an equity
interest in their farming operation on the strength of a promise to
provide labor and services in conducting the farming operation
according to the reorganization plan. 149 The bankruptcy court
agreed with Judge Gibson, the dissenting judge in Ahlers, that the
exception created for farmers in Ahlers was contrary to the clear
140. Id. at 372-75; see 11 U.S.C. S 1121(a) (1982) (debtor may file a plan for voluntary
reorganization).
141. Roberts, 63 Bankr. at 381; see Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395 (adequate protection payments begin
when the creditor could take possession of the collateral, sell it, and reinvest the proceeds). For a
discussion of the starting date of adequate protection, see supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
142. Roberts, 63 Bankr. at 381.
143. Id.
144. Id. The-bankruptcy court did, however, agreewith the Ahlers court's determination that the
timing of periodic protection payments should be considered in light of the cyclical nature of agric
culture. Id.; see Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 397 (the court should consider the cyclical nature of agriculture
when determining the timing of adequate protection payments). The court noted that farm lenders
often receive payments from mortgagors only at those times of the year when the farmers realize
income. Roberts, 63 Bankr. at 381.
145. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402. Fora discussion of the Ahlers court's analysis of a labor contribution
exception to the absolute priority rule, see supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
146. 64 Bankr. 296 (Bankr. C.D. Il1. 1986).
147. See In re Stegall, 64 Bankr. 296, 299 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986).
148. Id.. at 297; see 11 U.S.C. S 1121(a) (1982) (debtor may file a plan for a voluntary
reorganization).
149. See Stegall, 64 Bankr. at 298.
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weight of authority, which applied the absolute priority rule to
individuals and farmers. 150 In addition, the bankruptcy court
supported Judge Gibson's statement that if any changes were to be
made, Congress, not the courts, should make the changes. 151
The effect of the Ahlers decision on a debtor's obligation to
provide adequate protection, as a condition to maintaining the
automatic stay, will vary from state to state since the determination.
of the starting date for adequate protection payments depends upon
the creditor's right to possession of the collateral pursuant to state
law. 152  North Dakota has a foreclosure process similar to
Minnesota. 153 Since the court in Ahlers determined the starting date
for adequate protection payments according to Minnesota law, the
application of the court's decision to North Dakota law should
virtually parallel that interpretation. 
154
The decision in Ahlers did not address the application of the
labor contribution exception to the absolute priority rule in a non-
150. Stegall, 64 Bankr. at 301; see Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 407 (Gibson, J., dissenting). The
bankruptcy court asserted that the absolute priority rule was not appropriate in agricultural
bankruptcies. Stegall, 64 Bankr. at 301; see 11 U.S.C. S l129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III
1985) (a plan is fair and equitable if, pursuant to the absolute priority rule, unsecured claims are
provided for in full before the holder of any junior claims or interests retains any property under the
plan). For the text of S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), see supra note 58. The court reasoned that the debtor
farmer's effort to reorganize is motivated not so much by a desire to retain an interest of value in
property, but rather by a desire to remain on the family farm and continue with a way of life. Stegall,
64 Bankr. at 300-01 (citing In re Witt, 60 Bankr. 556, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ia. 1986)). The court stated,
however, that the absolute priority rule did not contain an exception for farmers. See id. Therefore,
the court concluded that the debtor farmers could not retain an ownership interest in their farm
without fully satisfying the claims of unsecured creditors. See id.; 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
151. Stegall, 64 Bankr. at 300; see Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 408. (Gibson, J., dissenting) (if there is to be
a change in the relationship between farmers and their creditors, Congress should make the change).
152. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395.
153. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. S 580.03 (West 1947) (six weeks published notice must be given
prior to a foreclosure sale) and MINN. STAT. ANN. S 580.23(2) (West Supp. 1987) (mortgagor may
redeem twelve months after a foreclosure sale) with N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-23-04 (1974) (notice of the
foreclosure must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks and the last published notice
must be at least ten days prior to the sale) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-24-02 (Supp. 1985) (judgment
debtor may redeem twelve months after sale).
154. Compare Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396 (adequate protection payments begin one year and six
weeks after the date foreclosure proceedings are started, and if no foreclosure proceedings are
commenced prior to the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding the adequate protection payments begin
one year and six months after a motion for adequate protection payments) with In re Asbridge, 66
Bankr. 894, 900-01 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) (adequate protection payments begin one year and three
months after the commencement of foreclosure proceedings if no final judgment has been rendered,
and if no foreclosure proceedings are initiated adequate protection payments begin one year and
three months after the creditors move for adequate protection). In Asbridge the court stated that the
first step in determining the date that adequate protection payments begin was to determine the date
to which foreclosure delays would be added. Id. at 900 (citing Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396). The court
determined that since the creditors had already obtained a judgment and a sheriff's sale had been
scheduled, the date to which the delays should be added was the date the foreclosure sale was
scheduled. Id. The court then determined the delays associated with foreclosure pursuant to North
Dakota law. See id. The court noted that foreclosure is started in North Dakota by serving notice of
foreclosure at least thirty days prior to commencement of a foreclosure action. Id.; see N.D. CENT.
CODE 5 32-19-20 (1976) (at least thirty days prior to foreclosure proceeding notice shall be served on
the title owner). The court then stated that after a summons and complaint were served on the
debtor, the debtor had twenty days to answer upon the creditor. Asbridge, 66 Bankr. at 900; see
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agricultural business sector.1 55 However, the labor contributions
that a farm owner makes to his or her farming operation are similar
to those made by entrepreneurs in small businesses.156 Therefore,
the labor contribution exception could reasonably be applied to the
reorganization of a small business.
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N.D.R. CIv. P. 12(a) (Supp. 1985) (defendant has twenty days after service of summons to serve an
answer upon the plaintiff). Moreover, the court stated that once a creditor obtains a judgment, the
creditor must publish notice of the foreclosure for three weeks, with the last publication at least ten
days prior to the sale. Asbridge, 66 Bankr. at 900; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-23-04 (1974) (notice of
the sale must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks and the last published notice must
be given at least ten days prior to the sale). Finally, the court noted that the redemption period in
North Dakota was one year. Asbridge, 66 Bankr. at 900; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-24-02 (Supp.
1985) (judgment debtor may redeem twelve months after sale). Thus, the court concluded that the
usual delay associated with foreclosure in North Dakota was fifteen months. Asbridge, 66 Bankr. at
901.
155. SeeAhlers, 794 F.2d at 388.
156. See Brief of the States at 26, supra note 8.
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